We develop a low-complexity and secrecy capacity achieving polar coding scheme for the discrete memoryless wiretap channel. Our scheme extends previous work by using a nearly optimal amount of uniform randomness in the stochastic encoder, and avoiding assumptions regarding the symmetry or degraded nature of the channels. The price paid for these extensions is that the encoder and decoder are required to share a secret seed of negligible size. We also highlight a close conceptual connection between the proposed polar coding scheme and a random binning proof of the secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been several attempts to develop explicit and low-complexity coding schemes achieving the fundamental secrecy limits of the wiretap channel models. In particular, coding schemes based on low-density parity-check codes [1] - [3] , polar codes [4] - [7] , and invertible extractors [8] , [9] have been developed for special cases of Wyner's wiretap model [10] .
In this paper, we develop a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the wiretap channel. We exploit chaining techniques [11] to avoid any restrictions on the channels. Moreover, rather than view randomness as a free resource, we adopt the point of view put forward in [12] , [13] , in which any randomness used for stochastic encoding must be explicitly accounted for. Specifically, we study the rate of randomness used at the encoder of our scheme and show its optimality. Note that for brevity we only deal with the wiretap channel model, our complete result for the broadcast channel with confidential messages can be found in [14] .
Results related to the present work and submitted to the same conference have been independently developed in [15] , [16] . When specialized to Wyner's wiretap model, our scheme is also related to [6] , but with a number of notable distinctions. Specifically, while no pre-shared secret seed is required in [6] , the coding scheme therein relies on a two-layer construction for which no efficient code construction is presently known [6, Section 3.3] .
The remaining of the paper is as follows. Sections II, III formally introduce the notation and the model under investigation. Section IV develops a random binning proof of the results in [12] , which serves as a guideline for the design of our proposed polar coding scheme, presented in Section V. Section VI provides sketch of analysis for our scheme.
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II. NOTATION
Let a, b be the set of integers between a and b . For n ∈ N and N 2 n , let G n be the source polarization transform defined in [17] . We note the components of a vector, X 1:N , of size N , with superscripts, i.e., X 1:N (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X N ). When the context makes clear that we are dealing with vectors, we write X N in place of X 1:N . We note V(·, ·) the variational distance between two distributions. Finally, we note the indicator function 1{ω}, which is equal to 1 if the predicate ω is true and 0 otherwise.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the problem of secure communication over a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (X , p Y Z|X , Y, Z). Definition 1. A (2 N R , N ) code C N for the wiretap channel consists of a confidential message set S 1, 2 N R , a stochastic encoding function f : S → X N , which maps the message s to x N , a decoding function g : Y N → S, which maps y N to the messageŝ. The strong secrecy capacity C s is defined as the supremum of such achievable rates. Theorem 1 ([10], [12] ). The strong secrecy capacity is
Moreover, the infimum randomness rate necessary at the stochastic encoder to achieve C s is
The main contribution of the present work is to develop a polar coding scheme for Theorem 1.
IV. FROM RANDOM BINNING TO POLAR BINNING
While random coding is often the natural tool to address channel coding problems, random binning is already found in [18] to establish the strong secrecy of the wiretap channel, and is the tool of choice in quantum information theory [19] . In Section IV-A, we sketch a random binning proof for Theorem 1, which allows us to clearly highlight the key steps of the constructions in Section V and of its sketch analysis in Section VI. In particular, the rate conditions developed in the random binning proof of Section IV-A directly translate into the definition of the polarization sets in Section IV-B.
A. Information-theoretic random binning
Random binning proofs rely on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Source-coding with side information). Consider a Discrete Memoryless Source (DMS) (X × Y, p XY ). For each x N ∈ X N , assign an index Φ(x N ) ∈ 1, 2 N R uniformly at random. If R > H(X|Y ), then 
The principle of a random binning proof of Theorem 1 is to consider a DMS (V × X × Y × Z, p V XY Z ) such that V − X − Y Z, and to assign two types of indices to source sequences by random binning. The first type identifies subset of sequences that play the roles of codebooks, while the second type labels sequences with indices that can be thought of as messages or randomization sequences. As explained in the next paragraphs, the crux of the proof is to show that the binning can be "inverted," so that the sources may be generated from independent choices of uniform codebooks and messages.
Confidential message encoding. We introduce three indices
, to ensure that the indices are independent of each other, of the source sequences Z N ;
, to ensure that the indices are independent of each other. The binning scheme induces a joint distribution p V N Ψ V R (1) S . To obtain a channel coding scheme, Alice encodes the realizations of independent and uniformly distributed indicesψ V ,r (1) , ands, into a sequenceṽ N drawn (1) ,s). The resulting joint distribution is again a close approximation of p V N Ψ V R (1) S , so that the scheme inherits the reliability and secrecy properties upon disclosingψ V .
Channel prefixing. We also introduce the indices ψ X|V ∈ 1, 2 N ρ X|V and r (2) ∈ 1, 2 N R (2) 0 such that
< H(X|V ) to ensure that the indices are independent of each other and and that knowing ψ X|V and r (2) one can reconstruct x N . The binning scheme induces a joint distribution p X N V N Ψ X|V R (2) . To obtain a channel prefixing scheme, Alice encodes the realizations of uniformly distributed indices ψ X|V andr (2) , and the previously obtainedṽ N into a sequencẽ
The resulting joint distribution induced is once again a close approximation of p X N V N Ψ X|V R (2) .
Chaining to de-randomize the codebooks. The downside of the described schemes is that they require sharing the indices ψ V , andψ X|V , identifying the codebooks between Alice and Bob; however, the rate cost may be amortized by reusing the same indices over sequences of k blocks. Specifically, the union bound shows that the average error probability over k blocks is at most k times that of an individual block, and a hybrid argument shows that the information leakage over k blocks is at most k times that of an individual block. Consequently, for k and N large enough, the impact of the transmission rates is negligible.
Total amount of randomness. The total amount of randomness required for encoding includes not only the explicit random numbers r (1) , r (2) , used for the confidential message encoding and channel prefixing, respectively, but also all the randomness required in the stochastic encoding to approximate the source distribution. One can show that the rate of the later is negligible; we omit the proof of this result for random binning, but this is analyzed precisely for polar codes in Section V. By combining all the rate constraints above and Fourier-Motzkin elimination, one recovers the rates in Theorem 1.
B. Binning with polar codes
The main observation to translate the analysis of Section IV-A into a polar coding scheme is that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 have the following counterparts.
Y |X . and createx 1:N ũ 1:N G n . Then,
In other words, the high entropy bits in positions H X|Y play the same role as the random binning index in Lemma 1. However, note that the construction ofx 1:N in Lemma 3 is explicitly stochastic.
Lemma 4 (adapted from [20] ). Consider a DMS (X × Z, p XZ ). For each x 1:N ∈ F N 2 polarized as u 1:N G n x 1:N , let u 1:N [V X|Z ] denote the very high entropy bits of
The very high entropy bits in positions V X|Z therefore play the same role as the random binning index in Lemma 2.
This suggests that any result obtained from random binning could also be derived using source polarization as a linear and low-complexity alternative; intuitively, information theoretic constraints resulting from Lemma 1 translate into the use of "high entropy" sets H, while those resulting from Lemma 2 translate into the use of "very high entropy" sets V. However, unlike the indices resulting from random binning, the high entropy and very high entropy sets may not necessarily be aligned, and the precise design of a polar coding scheme requires more care.
In the remainder of the paper, we consider a DMS
We now highlight the key steps of our polar coding scheme, whose detailed description can be found in Section V.
Confidential message encoding. Define the polar transform of V 1:N as B 1:N V 1:N G n and the sets
If the inclusion H V |Y ⊆ V V |Z were true, then we would place random bits identifying the codebook in positions H V |Y , random bits describing the confidential message in positions V V |Z \ H V |Y , random bits describing a randomization sequence in positions V V \ V V |Z , use successive cancellation encoding to compute the bits in positions V c V |Z and approximate the source distribution, and use chaining to amortize the rate cost of the bits in positions H V |Y . This is unfortunately not directly possible in general, and one needs to exploit chaining to realign the indices, and transmit the bits in positions H V |Y ∩V c V separately and secretly to Bob.
Channel prefixing. Define the polar transform of X 1:N as T 1:N X 1:N G n and the associated sets 
contains almost deterministic bits Fig. 1 . Chaining for the encoding of the B 1:N i 's, which corresponds to the encoding of the confidential message. In Block i ∈ 1, k , S i is the confidential message, R One performs channel prefixing by placing random bits identifying the code in positions V X|V Z , random bits describing a randomization sequence in positions V X|V \ V X|V Z , and using successive cancellation encoding to compute the bits in positions V c X|V and approximate the source distribution. Chaining is finally used to amortize the cost of randomness for describing the code.
V. POLAR CODING SCHEME
Recall that the joint probability distribution p V XY Z is fixed and defined as in Section IV-B. As alluded to earlier, we perform the encoding over k blocks of size N . Specifically, in every block i ∈ 1, k − 1 , Alice first encodes the confidential message, and then performs channel prefixing, before she moves to the next block i + 1. We use the subscript i ∈ 1, k to denote random variables associated to encoding Block i.
Confidential message encoding. In addition to the polarization set defined in (1)-(4), we also define B V |Y a fixed subset
The encoding procedure with chaining is summarized in Fig. 1 .
In Block 1, the encoder forms V 1:N 1 as follows. Let S 1 be a vector of |V V |Z | uniformly distributed bits representing the confidential message and let R 
where the components of s 1 and r
1 have been indexed by the set of indices V V |Z and V V \V V |Z , respectively. Consequently, note that
The random bits that identify the codebook required for reconstruction are those in positions H V |Y , which we split as
Note that Ψ V 1 is uniformly distributed but Φ V 1 is not. Consequently, we may reuse Ψ V 1 in the next block but we cannot reuse Φ V 1 . We instead share Φ V 1 secretly between Alice and Bob and we show later that this may be accomplished with negligible rate cost. Finally, define V 1:N 1 B 1:N 1 G n . In Block i ∈ 2, k , the encoder forms V 1:N i as follows. Let S i be a vector of |V V |Z \B V |Y | uniformly distributed bits and R (1) i be a vector of |V V \V V |Z | uniformly distributed bits that represent the confidential message and a randomization sequence in block i, respectively. Given s i , r
where the components of s i , ψ V i−1 , and r 
The random bits that identify the codebook required for reconstruction are those in positions H V |Y , which we split as Ψ V i and Φ V i defined in the same way as for Block 1.
Again, Ψ V i is uniformly distributed but Φ V i is not, so that we reuse Ψ V i in the next block but we share Φ V i securely between Alice and Bob. We show later that the cost of sharing Φ V i is negligible. In Block k, Alice securely shares
Channel prefixing. The channel prefixing procedure with chaining is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In Block 1, the encoder forms X 1:N 1 as follows. Let R (2) 1 be a vector of |V X|V \V X|V Z | uniformly distributed bits representing the randomness required for channel prefixing. Given a randomization sequence r 
where the components of r
1 have been indexed by the set of indices V X|V \V X|V Z , so that R
The random bits that identify the codebook are those in position V X|V Z , which we denote Ψ X|V 1
the corresponding channel outputs.
In Block i ∈ 2, k , the encoder forms X 1:N i as follows. Let R (2) i be a vector of |V X|V \V X|V Z | uniformly distributed bits representing the randomness required for channel prefixing in block i. Given a randomization sequence r 
where the components of r Remark. The coding scheme requires a small pre-shared seed between the legitimate users for the two following reasons. 1) Note that in Lemma 1, one cannot replace H X|Y by
i.e., U 1:N cannot be losslessly reconstructed from
This remark illustrates the trade-off between lossless source coding and the intrinsic randomness problem [21] - [23] . It implies for our coding scheme the partition of
is secretly transmitted from Alice to Bob thanks to a small pre-shared secret seed.
2) To deal with unaligned indices due to the potentially nondegraded channels, chaining also requires in the last encoding block to secretly transmit Ψ V k with a pre-shared secret seed.
VI. RESULT
An analysis of the coding scheme of Section V yields the following result.
Theorem 2 (Special case of [14] ). Consider a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (X , p Y Z|X , Y, Z). The coding scheme of Section IV, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N , and whose computational complexity is O(kN log N ) achieves the secrecy capacity C s with an optimal rate of randomness R * 0 used at the encoder. The proof of Theorem 2 follows in four steps. Details are omitted and can be found in [14] , which deals with the more general model of the broadcast channel with confidential messages.
First, we show that the polar coding scheme of Section V approximates the statistics of the original DMS (V × X × Y × Z, p V XY Z ) from which the polarization sets were defined. Specifically, we have the following result. Second, using [20, Lemma 1] and [17] , we can show that (R, R 0 ) achieves (C s , R * 0 ) in Theorem 1 as N → ∞, k → ∞. More precisely, the rate of randomness used for encoding the confidential message is equal to I(V ; Z), whereas the rate of randomness used for channel prefixing is I(X; Z|V ). We can also show that the rate of the secret sequence that must be shared between the legitimate users to initialize the coding scheme vanishes to zero as N → ∞, k → ∞.
Third, we can show using an optimal coupling and Lemma 5 that the decoding error probability vanishes to zero with the blocklength, i.e., P S = S N →∞,k→∞ − −−−−−−− → 0.
Finally, we can prove that strong secrecy holds using Lemma 5 and by a careful analysis of the inter-blocks dependencies, specifically I(S 1:k ; Z 1:N 1:k ) N →∞,k→∞ − −−−−−−− → 0.
